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FROM FAIRNESS IN SPIRIT TO FAIRNESS IN LETTER: 
A Comment on the New Guidelines for the Refugee Status Advisory Ccwr~~tiObe 
By Howard Adelman 
Following recommendations of the 
Task .Force on Immigration Practices 
and Procedures published in its report on 
the refugee status determination 
process, Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of 
Employment and Immigrat ion,  
announced the issuance of new 
guidelines to govern the Refugee Status 
Advisory Committee (RSAC) in its 
consideration of claims for refugee 
status in Canada. Do the guidelines 
advance the cause of fairness in 
considering refugee claims? 
The Pmmnble 
Under the guidelines the RSAC is to 
consider each claim individually, 
subject to two caveats: the I6gd 
definition of a refugee and "the 'spirit' of 
interpretation which the Minister desires 
in the application of this definition." 
Presumably the latter is included to 
clearly tell the RSAC who's boss; but it 
may set a bad precedent. The present 
Minister wishes the definition to be 
interpreted "liberally," which reflects the 
spirit of the 1951 United Nations' 
Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees as interpreted in case law. The 
interpretive case law provides an 
objective basis for determining 
guidelines. However, with a suggestion 
in the preamble that the guidelines 
derive not from this body of law but from 
Ministerial desire, the guidelines are 
character ized no t  as part  of 
administrative law but simply as an 
expression of Ministerial fiat. This leaves 
open the possibilities of a subsequent 
Minister interpreting the definition in a 
highly restrictive way; of arbitrariness; 
and of increased inconsistency as 
Ministers change. Axworthy should 
correct the formalization of the 
Minister's role. 
Credibility- Asrrersment 
The guidelines themselves are of two 
types: criteria for determining the status 
of a claimant, and principles for the 
consideration of evidence in the 
determination process. In the case of a 
refugee there is often little independent 
documentation to prove a claim. But if 
no proof were needed, anyone could 
claim to have a well-founded fear of 
persecution. What then should be the 
basis for deciding that a claimant is 
telling the truth? 
Under the guidelines, a claimant is to 
receive the benefit of the doubt. The 
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principle of the benefit of the doubt can 
be interpreted in several ways. The 
Minister, consistent with case law. 
interprets it in the direction of the 
narrowest sense. As he said in his 
speech when he announced the 
guidelines, "The applicant is presumed 
to be telling the truth unless there is 
clear evidence to the contrary," or, as 
stated in the guidelines, "unless there be 
reason to doubt the truthfulness." Not 
conclusive contrary evidence, or even 
an overbalance of contrary evidence, 
but simply clear evidence or reason to 
doubt. This reasonably restrictive 
procedure is a correct- one40 ensure 
fairness to refugees without opening the 
system to abuse. 
The Refugee DdhwWom 
In the guidelines related to the 
application of the refugee oerinit~on 
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By Barrie Zwicker 
"Q,TTAWA TO EASE IMMIGRATION BARC#ERS' 
- Headline in the Saint John Telegraph-Journal over its (CP) story on the 
NationaMymposium on Refugee Determination 
The majority of daily newspapers in 
Canada ignored the Nat ional  
Symposium on Refugee Determination. 
The majority of those that did not ignore 
it used wire copy. A tiny minority of 
papers sent staff reporters. Most 
coverage fell into two archetypes that 
characterize so much "news" in our 
papers. 
Most of the coverage was based on 
governmental pronouncements, in this 
casa statements by Employment and 
Immigration Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
and External Affairs Minister Mark 
MacGuigan. Cabinet minister speaks. 
Notes are taken. Story appears on front 
page. Appears because cabinet minister 
has spoken. It's a variation of "handout 
journalism", rooted in an all-too- 
common journalistic premise that 
officials make news by pronouncing. 
This was aided, in Mr. Axworthy's 
case, by his use of the magic word "new" 
in his announcement of the guidelines 
he issued to the Refugee Status 
Advisory Committe (RSAC). "New" is 
one of the seven words found most 
effective in advertising. 'We're breaking 
new ground here," Mr. Axworthy claimed 
of his "new guidelines" at a press 
conference. The quote made nearly 
every story. Only one paper surveyed, 
the Winnipeg Free Press, ran a 
subsequent story based on statements 
by Ken Brown, then Chairman of the 
RSAC. Mr. Brown was quoted by 
Canadian Press as claiming the 
guidelines "are not new at all" and that 
"no foreigners rejected in the past would 
have been accepted under the new 
rules." 
The issues that were not addressed by 
any Minister, including those that were 
addressed at some length by the 
Symposium as a whole such the 
provision of oral hearings to refugee 
claimants, were generally not amressea 
by the press. 
The other archtype is the conflict 
story. "New refugee laws too loose: 
Professor," read a mis!ezding 
headline in the Toronto Star. T k  story 
under that headline was a reasonable 
attempt by a journeyman reporter to 
summarize key points in the discussion 
about the guidelines at the Symposium. 
The reporter, increasing the chances of 
his story being used, led off with a 
criticism of a perceived excessive 
vagueness in the guidelines, expressed 
by Professor Howard Adelman. Most of 
the story, however, reflected general 
agreement wi th the guidelines 
expressed by other Symposium 
participants. The headline writer - 
exhibiting one of the common mistakes 
of headline writers - went further than 
the story did, by calling the guidelines 
"law". 
The Globe and Maifs conflict story, 
"Two Ministers offer different solutions 
to refugee problem", was created by an 
essentially false dichotomy being drawn 
between remarks of Mr. Axworthy and 
remarks of Mr. MacGuigan: "Two 
solutions to the refugee problem were 
proposed by two federal Cabinet 
ministers . . . letting more of them into 
the country and sending them home." 
Mr. Axworthy had been speaking on 
refugee protection in Canada and Mr. 
MacGuigan had been speaking on 
responses to large-scale refugee 
movements abroad. 
Barrie Zwicker is a media analyst. 
there are some vague areas that could 
cause problems. What justifies a well- 
founded fear of persecution? Past 
persecution does. The possibility of 
future persecution does as well. But the 
guidelines are not clear as to whether 
the possibility of future persecution 
need be only very slight or whether it 
must be likely. In his speech Axworthy 
referred to "reasonable grounds to fear 
persecution in future," suggesting that 
he intends the guidelines to mean the 
latter, which would be consistent with 
case law. 
Guideline (4) indicates that a well- 
founded fear may be based "on what has 
happened to others in  similar 
circumstances." Is "similar circum- 
stances" to be interpreted narrowly, 
which could be unfair to legitimate 
refugees, or broadly, which could leave 
the door open for virtually anyone in a 
country producing refugees to apply for 
refugee status? This guideline needs 
further clarification. 
That persecution may take economic 
and institutional forms, such as 
exclusion from institutions of higher 
learning, is specified in guideline (5). 
But a list of such forms of persecution is 
given. The list is incomplete: What about 
forcing certain people to live in 
ghettos? To wear distinctive items of 
apparel? It would be preferable if the 
situations cited were expl ici t ly 
presented as examples, lest the list be 
interpreted to be exhaustive. 
The guidelines are biased toward 
assuming that the agent of persecution 
is a government or a vigilante group 
tolerated by a government. (See, for 
example, guidelines (8) and ( l l ) .)  Those 
who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution by anti-government forces 
and whom the government is unable to 
protect adequately also deserve 
consideration for refugee status. 
Gu ide l i ne  (11) i s  somewhat 
paradoxical. If an individual has a well- 
founded fear of persecution because of 
'his political opinion, he can claim 
refugee status. According to guideline 
( l l ) ,  having a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of a political 
opinion does not entail that the 
individual was politically active, but only 
that he is regarded by the persecutor as 
having a political opinion which 
warrants persecution. But the guideline 
goes on to say that the individual "may 
have been totally inactive politically and 
have no political opinions of his own." 
To say an individual may be admitted as 
a refugee because he has a well- 
founded fear of persecution based on 
his political opinion when he in fact 
holds no political opinion at all makes 
the world of refugee law sound like an 
Alice in Wonderland world. The 
difficulty stems, of course, from the fact 
that a persecutor may in fact exhibit 
about as much logic as the Queen of 
Hearts in his interpretation of what is 
political. But we should not commit the 
same error in our formulation. This 
%guideline warrants more thought. 
Finally, a serious ambiguity in the 
meaning of "persecution" is introduced 
in guideline (8) which states that 
"persecution" may take the form of 
indiscriminate terror . . . Persons with a 
well-founded fear of becoming victims 
of governmental terrorist tactics may be 
refugees." The intention of the guideline 
is to protect individuals with a well- 
founded fear of being potential targets 
of terror. But if terror is indiscriminate, 
by definition every person in thecountry 
involved is a potential target of terror. 
Hence, any person in a state which 
practiqes indi~criminate terror - and 
there &re many of these - could, under 
the guidelines, be entitled to refugee 
status. Immediate clarification of this 
guideline is needed if R is not to be used 
to launch myriad claims that the 
guidetines w r e  not intended to 
encompass. 
For such people may be refugees in 
the ordinary sense of the word. And 
Canada may feel a humanitarian 
obligation to extend asylum to them. But 
we should do so under the designated 
class rubric. The guidelines, and the 
refugee determination process in 
general, are concerned with refugees in 
the legal sense of the word - Convention 
refugees. We extend asylum to them not 
simply in  virtue of feelings of 
humanitarian obligation, but in virtue of 
a legal obligation as a signatory to the 
international instruments of refugee 
protection. With guidelines which can1 
be interpreted to broaden the interpre- 
tation of the refugee definition far 
beyond the existing legislation as inter- 
preted by case law - in this case replacing 
the notion of persecution based on 
specific criteria (race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group 
or political opinion) with the notion of 
indiscriminate persecution - we run the 
risk of undermining the clarity of the 
legal definition and with it, the clarity of 
our legal obligation to protect refugees. 
Also, with guidelines which are too 
vague, we run the risk of inviting abuse by 
encouraging claims for refugee status 
which, since the guidelines are not law, 
might eventually be turned down, but 
could in the meantime create a backlog 
in the determination system, which 
would be unfair to legitimate claimants. 
Inviting either of these risks would not 
advance the cause of treating refugees 
fairly in the long run. 
On the whole, then, the guidelines 
advance considerably the cause of 
fairness in considering refugee claims; but 
some corrections and clarifications are 




1. It is recognized that no two refugee 
claims are the same. Each Committee 
member will use his or her best judgement 
in arriving at a recommendation in an 
individual case. Nevertheless, the 
discretion which is exercised bv 
Committee members is circumscribed in 
two significant respects. The first involves 
the legal definition of a "Convention 
Refugee" as found in the Immigration Act, 
1976. The second involves the "spirit" of 
interpretation of which the Minister 
desires in theapplication of thisdefinition. 
In this respect, members should bear in 
mind that they have been appointed to 
provide recommendations to the Minister 
and are not, in law, performingadecision- 
making function. While the Committee is 
independent of Employment and 
Immigration Canada, it is subordinate to 
the Minister. 
2. It is hoped that, together with the 
explanatory material set forth in the 
UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and 
Critera for Determining Refugee Status, 
these guidelines will assist Committee 
members in meeting both the legal 
requirements of our legislation and the 
"spirit" of our international commitmemt 
to refugees. 
Guideiines: Refugee Definition 
3.When the application of the refugee 
definition to a claimant is in doubt, the 
claimant will recive the benefit of the 
doubt. 
4. A person is a refugee if he has a well- 
founded fear of future persecution based 
on one of the five criteria in the definition. 
Past persecution is evidence to 
substantiate a well-founded fear. 
However, it is not the only evidence. A 
person may not have been persecuted in 
the past, and yet still be a refugee. 
Looking, as it does, to the future, the 
refugee definition is concerned with 
possibilities and probabilities rather than 
with certainties. A well-founded fear may 
be based on what has happened to others 
in similar circumstances. When a person 
has not been persecuted simply because 
he has not yet come to the attention of the 
authorities, he need not wait until he has 
been detected and persecuted before he 
can claim refugee status. Nor need he be 
under the threat of imminent persecution. 
5. Interference with personal freedom is 
not the only form of persecution within the 
refugee definition. Arbitrary interference 
with-a person's privacy, family, home or 
correspondence may constitute 
persecution. Deprivation of all means of 
earning a livelihood, denial of work 
commensurate with training and 
qualifications or unreasonably low pay 
may constitute persecution. Relegation to 
substandard dwellings, exclusion from 
institutions of higher learning, enforced 
social and civil inactivity, denational- 
ization, passport denial, constant 
surveillance and pressure to become an 
informer may all constitute persecution. 
iEE STATUS ADVISORY COMMITTEE GUIDELINES ON REFUGEE DEFINITION 
AND ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY, FEBRUARY 20,1982. 
6. Persecution rnay include behavior 
tolerated by government in such a way as 
to leave thevictim virtually unprotected by 
the agencies of the state. A person is a 
refugee if he has a well-founded fear of 
persecution (as a result of one of the five 
factors in the definition) because he is not 
adequately protected by his government. 
7. Persecution may be periodic. It need 
not be continuous. A person arrested from 
time to time, interrogated and then 
released may be considered to be 
persecuted. Arrest need not be imminent 
at the time he leaves his country. He may 
even return to that country for a short 
period of time without being arrested. As 
long as the pattern of periodic arrest can 
be expected to continue, persecution may 
be established. 
8. Persecution may take the form of 
indiscriminate terror. Persons may be 
persecuted for no apparent cause at all. 
other than for the purpose of instilling 
fright into the population at large. Persons 
with a well-founded fear of becoming 
victims of governmental terrorist tactics 
may be refugees. 
9. A person is a refugee whether he is 
persecuted alone, or persecuted with 
others. A person need not be singled out 
for persecution in order to be a refugee. 
Each claim must be assessed individually. 
Once that assessment takes place, aclaim 
cannot be rejected simply because a large 
number of others could also legitimately 
fear the same persecution. 
10. It is recognized that immigration 
considerations must not be brought to 
bear on the application of the refugee 
definition. The possibility that, if one 
person is given refugee status, many 
others might also be entitled to claim 
refugee status, is not relevant to whether 
the claimant is a refugee. 
11. A person is a political refugee if he has 
a well-founded fear based on political 
opinion. He need not have a well-founded 
fear based on political activity. Political 
opinion means what is political in the 
opinion of the government from which the 
refugee flees. not what is political in the 
opinion of the refugee, or in theopinion of 
Canadian officials. A person may have 
been totally inactive politically and have 
no political opinions of his own. Yet he 
may, nonetheless, be a political refugee. 
The political prominence of the claimant 
is evidence of the l ikel ihood of 
persecution but it is not a pre-requisite. A 
person who is disposed to clash politically 
. with authorities from his country and who 
wil l  probably or possibly suffer 
persecution because of that disposition 
may be a refugee. 
12. A well-founded fear of persecution 
need not arise before the claimant has left 
his country. It may be based on what has 
happened in the country since the 
claimant has been abroad. A person who 
was not a refugee at the time he left his 
country but who becomes a refugee after 
he leaves, is a refugee "sur place". 
13. A person may be a refugee even 
though he was able to leave his country 
without difficulty. He may haveobtained a 
passport through official channels. He 
may not have been stopped by officials at 
the port of exit. As long as he has a well- 
founded fear of persecition based on the 
reasons in the definition should he have 
stayed, or should he return, he is a 
Convention refugee. 
14. In determining whether there is a well- 
founded fear of persecution, what is 
relevant, is the practice in the country the 
refugee flees. The legal structure in the 
country is not, in itself, conclusive. 
Guidellnw: dredlblllty Assessment 
15. When the credibility of the claimant is 
in doubt, the claimant will receive the 
benetit of the doubt. An applicant who 
swears to certain allegations will be 
presumed to be tell' the truth unless 
there be reash to d s t  the truthfulness 
of those allegations. 
16. Inconsistency, misrepresentation, or 
concealment in a claim should not lead to 
a finding of incredibility where the 
inconsistency, misrepresentation or 
concealment is not material totheclaim. If 
a statement is not believed but if the claim 
would be well-founded apart from that 
statement, then refugee status should be 
granted. 
17. The fact that a claim was made only 
after the claimant received the advice of a 
lawyer is not relevant to the credibility of 
the claim. This is not a factor to be taken 
into account in determining credibility. 
18. There are a number of factors which 
may be indicative of a lack of credibility. 
However, it is important to bear in mind 
that they may also be consistent with 
other rational conclusions. These factors 
must be assessed in each individual case 
and in the broader context of the special 
pressures which refugees frequently face: 
(a) A claim may be credible even though 
the claim was not made at the earliest 
opportunity. A genuine refugee may well 
wait until he is safely in thecountry before 
making a claim. He cannot, in every case. 
be expected to claim refugeestatus at the 
port of entry. A genuine refugee may not 
be aware, immediately, of his entitlement 
to refugee status. He may be in the 
country for some time before he becomes 
aware of our refugee claims procedure. 
(b) A claim may be credible even though, 
since leaving home, theclaimant has been 
in another country besides Canada and 
has not claimed refugee status in that 
country. The third country may have hada 
regime similar to the one which the 
claimant was fleeing. A genuine refugee 
may have felt it unnecessary to claim 
refugee status in a third country, because 
he was able to stay in the third country for 
the time he wished without claiming 
refugee status. 
(c) A claim may be credible even though 
the claimant has not approached the 
Canadian mission in his home country 
and claimed refugee status. Even for those 
countries (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) 
where it is possible to claim refugeestatus 
at home, a genuine refugee may fear that 
making such a claim at home would lead 
to detention and persecution. 
(d) Even where a statement is material, 
and is not believed, a person may, 
nonetheless, be a refugee. "Lies do not 
prove the converse." Where a claimant is 
lying, and the lie is material to hiscase, the 
Refugee Status Advisory Committee 
must, nonetheless, look at all of the 
evidence and arrive at a conclusion on the 
entire case. Indeed, an earlier lie which is 
openly admit ted may, i n  some 
circumstances, be a factor to consider in 
support of credibility. 
(e) A claim may be credible even though 
the claimant submits information during a 
second examination (for example, on an 
out-of-status claim following an in-status 
claim) which was not submitted during the 
first examination. The claimant may have 
been reluctant to speak freely during the 
first examination but may be prepared to 
provide a full and accurate account on the 
second occasion. 
(f) A person may be a credible claimant 
even though he has never been 
persecuted. The absence of actual 
detention or detection by theauthoritesor 
of wounds should not lead to the 
assumption of fabrication. 
(g) A claim may be credible even though it 
is similar to other claims. A claimant 
should not be suspected of fabricating his 
claim simply because the pattern of his 
claim is similar to the pattern of other 
claims before the Refugee Status 
Advisory Committee. 
(h) A claim may be credibleeven though it 
is different from other claims. A claimant 
should not be suspected of fabrication 
because his statements are different from 
statements made by other refugee 
claimants originating from the same 
country. 
I THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE 
Canada's Immigration Act takes its 
definition of a refugee from the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. Section (2) reads 
in part, "In this Act . . . 'Convention 
refugee' means any person who, by 
reason of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinion, 
(a) is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country, or 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is 
outside the country of his former habitual 
residence and is unable or, by reason of 
such fear, is unwilling to return to that 
country." 
